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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
BENJAMIN F. ALWARD, 
Plaintiff -Appellant, 
vs. 
R. E. GREEN, doing business as 
NATIONAL SCHOOL ASSEM-
BLIES, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
RESP~ONDENT '.S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts set 
forth in the appellant's brief, but desires to give in more 
detail the evidence relating to the purported agency of 
R. W. Dill, upon whom the attempted service of sum-
mons was made. 
Dill was a resident of San Diego, California. On 
January 16, 1950, he and his brother were in Salt Lake 
City for the purpose of filling engagements booked for 
them by the defendant {R. 30). The defendant had acted 
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as their agent in securing said bookings. Dill was en-
gaged in filling such bookings for a period of only five 
weeks. He had just commenced filling said engagements 
when the summons was served on the 16th day of Jan-
uary, 1950 and when the matter was heard on the 11th 
day of February, 1950, he had completed his engage-
ments and was intending to return to San Diego. While 
in Salt Lake he and his brother had fulfilled three book-
ings made for them by Mr. Clarence Smith at Salt Lake 
Ctiy, who, like the defendant, was also a booking agent. 
These performances were given two at the Hotel Utah 
and one at the Newhouse Hotel. The defendant received 
nothing from those performances (R. 31). The defendant 
had no control over the operations of Dill other than 
seeing that the bookings made for Dill by the defendant 
were filled (R. 32). Dill retained the first $200.00 per 
week collected for performances given pursuant to book-
ings by the defendant and all over $200.00 per week 
collected by Dill was paid to the defendant for defend-
ant's services (R. 32). With very few exceptions all 
checks were made directly to Dill from the schools where 
the performances were given. Occasionally a school 
would make a check payable to National School Assem-
blies (R. 33). Dill did not carry a power of attorney 
to cash any check made out to the National School As-
semblies and would send any such check to the defendant 
as a credit on any balance over $200.00 collected for any 
week (R. 34). Collections were made by Dill for himself 
not for the defendant (R. 36). Before leaving California 
to fill engagements made for him by the defendant, Dill 
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received a min1eographed set of suggestions from the 
defendant. Dill received no directions from the defend-
ant relative to the giving of a show other or different 
from those received from any other booking agent of the 
said Dill (R. 39). That the Defendant determined where 
Dill would perform and sent to Dill a schedule ahead 
of time. That Green had set a prearranged price for 
Dill's program and scheduled a number of programs 
to be given and suggested the length of time of the p·ro-
gram (R. 40). 
There is one other fact that the defendant desires 
to call attention to. As stated in the app·ellant 's brief 
•at page 7: 
''While in Salt Lake City the plaintiff cor-
responded with defendant. As a result of this 
correspondence and because of his not reaching 
South Dakota, the plaintiff received a letter from 
the defendant whereby the latter cancelled the 
remainder of the plaintiff's tour of the midwest 
for the year and terminated the plaintiff's con-
tract (Exhibit A)." 
Exhibit "A" was signed and mailed in Los An-
geles, Californi•a, and was in answer to a letter of 
inquiry from the plaintiff concerning plaintiff's future 
activities. Exhibit "A" was received in Salt Lake 
City by the plaintiff. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
1. The Court erred in finding that the defendant 
had an agent in Utah if by that the Court me'a.nt that 
R. W. Dill was an agent of the defendant upon whom 
service of summons could be made under the provi-
sions of Rule 17 (e) and Rule 4 (e) (10), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
2. The Court did not err in holding that the 
defendant by and through R. W. Dill, the purported 
agent upon whom service of summons was made, was 
not doing business at the school where the .attempted 
service of summons was made within the contempla-
tion of Rules 17 (e) and 4 (e) ( 10) of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
3. The Court did not err in holding that the 
school -at which the defendant's purported 'agent 
was served with summons was not a place of business 
of the defendant within the contemplation of Rules 
17 (e) and 4 (e) ( 10) . 
4. The Court did not err in holding that the 
cause of action did not arise out of the conduct of 
business in the State of Utah within the contemplation 
of Rule 17 (e) and Rule 4 {e) (10). 
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ARGU~1ENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DE-
FENDANT HAD AN AGENT IN UTAH IF BY THAT THE 
COURT MEANT THAT R. W. DILL WAS AN AGENT OF 
THE DEFENDANT UPON WHOM SERVICE OF SUMMONS 
COULD BE MADE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 
17 (e) AND RULE 4 (e) (10), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
Rule 17 (e) provides : 
"When a nonresident person is associated in 
and conducts business "\\7ithin the State of Utah 
in one or more places in his own name or a 
common trade name ·a.nd said business is con-
ducted under the supervision of a manager, 
superintendent or agent, said person may be 
sued in his own name in any action arising out 
of the conduct of said business. '' 
Rule 4 (e) (10) provides: 
''Personal Service in this State. Personal 
service within the state shall be as follows: 
* * * (10) upon a natural person, non-
resident of the State of Utah, doing business in 
this state at one or more places of business as 
set forth in Rule 17 (e) by delivering a copy 
thereof to the defendant personally, or to one 
of his managers, superintendents, or ·agents." 
Any act providing for substituted service upon 
an individual in order to be constitutional must provide 
certain safeguards for the defendant. The following 
discussion from the case of Davidson v. Doherty & 
Company, 214 Iowa 739, 241 N.W. 700, 91 A.L.R. 1308, 
points out these requirements: 
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"It is frequently stated as a general proposi-
tion that the processes of a state court do not 
extend beyond its borders and that a state can-
not in general obtain jurisdiction of a nonresident 
in an action in personam unless the defendant is 
served within the state or appears to the action. 
To this broad and general statement of the rule 
there are exceptions, as for example, where 
there is a waiver or a contract to the con-
trary * * * 
''Another exception, or more properly speak-
ing, a rule 'a.s to what constitutes due notice is 
illustrated by the cases upholding statutes where 
a nonresident of a state, by carrying on certain 
lines of business or doing certain acts, as deal-
ing in securities or driving an automobile on 
the public highways, is required, or presumed, 
to designate !an officer or agent in said state 
upon whom service of notice may be made in 
actions in said state growing out of the business 
or acts done * * * 
"Similarly, there are statutes such as the 
one under consideration, where a nonresident 
voluntarily comes within the state and establishes 
an office or agency and transacts business, and the 
service of summons is made by substituted service 
upon the agent of the defndant, and the action is 
one growing out of that office or 'agency. 
''Does such a statute meet the requirements 
of 'notice and opportunity to defend'~ If notice 
on 'a public officer, such as a registrar or secre-
tary of state is sufficient in an action in per-
sonam .against a nonresident no good reason is 
apparent why a notice by like substituted service 
on a party's own agent in charge of his business 
in actions growing out of such business should 
not be equally valid.'' 
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The question then becomes one of whether or not 
substituted service is on a party's agent in ch,arge of 
his business. If the one served is not an agent in 
charge of the defendant's business, the requirements 
of notice and opportunity to defend are not met. 
The court said in Davidson v. Doherty d!; Company, 
supra: 
"As is said in Hess v. Pawloski, 27 4 U.S. 355, 
47 S. Ct. 632-633, 71 L.ed. 1091: 'The mere 
transaction of business in a state by nonresident 
persons does not imply consent to be bound by 
the process of its courts.' 
"Moreover, the agency of one upon whom 
service is made must be such as to render it 
fairly reasonable and just to imply authority 
on the part o~ the agent to receive service * * * 
"The agent must he one who may fairly be 
presumed to have the duty of communicating 
to his principal the fact of service.'' 
In the case of Wein v. Crockett, 195 Pac. (2d) 222 
at page 228, Justice Latimer, speaking for the majority, 
stated: 
"The act requires service of p·rocess to be 
made on an agent of the nonresident and that 
tl!e agent at the time of service must be con-
ducting the business for ·and on behalf of the 
nonresident and the action must arise out of 
the business transacted in the state. If the 
agent has the capacity to perform as manager, 
superintendent or agent in supervising the affairs 
of a nonresident, we can infer he will have the 
capacity to understand the necessity of notify-
ing the principal in time to permit proper pro-
tection of the principal's rights." 
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The appellant cites at length in his brief from the 
case of Melvin Pine &; Compwny v. MoConnell, 273 
App. Div. 218, 76 NYS (2d) 279, 10 A.L.R. (2d) 194. 
In that case the Court said: 
''The statutory requirements for doing busi-
ness in this state is not satisfied unless a sub-
stantial part of the business is conducted within 
the state and the person in charge thereof in-
vested with general powers of judgment and 
discretion * * * 
''Nevertheless on the record in this case there 
would seem to be no gainsaying the fact that 
they (the parties served) were agents invested 
with general powers involving judgment and 
discretion in connection with the defendant's 
business and the advancement of defendant's 
interests.'' 
Dill was not such an agent as the statute contenl-
plates. He was an independent contractor. He was the 
principal and Green was his agent. Dill was under no 
duty to transact any business for the defendant and 
he was under no duty to communicate the fact of 
service to the defendant. 
Rule 4 (e) (10) provides that service may be 
made in this state at one or more places of business. 
The statute contemplates a permanent office or place 
of business at which an agent or superintendent shall 
be in charge whose duty it is to transact the business 
of the nonresident defendant, invested with general 
powers of judgment and discretion in directing the 
affairs of the nonresident defendant. A performer who 
is fulfilling an itinerary or schedule previously booked 
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by the defendant and who had no duty to perform 
other than fulfilling those bookings and paying any 
surplus that he received over $200.00 a week, was not 
such a manager, superintendent or agent within the 
contempl~ation of the statute and the school building 
was not a place of business within the contemplation 
of the statute. 
The defendant calls the attention of the Court to 
the fact that the evidence as to the authority of 
Alward, the plaintiff, as set forth at pages 24 to 28 
of the plaintiff's brief, does not ·apply to Dill. Dill 
definitely stated that he did not have a power of 
attorney to cash or endorse any ch-ecks such as Alward 
had. Nor is there any evidence that the other matters 
therein set forth had any application to the rel·ationship· 
existing between Dill and the defendant. Alward 
intended to act as a performer for a year or more. 
Green made bookings for Dill for a period of five 
weeks only. 
There are two methods of serving nonresident 
defendants. One is that set forth in the second para-
graph of the first quotation from Davidson v. D·ohe.rty, 
supra. Such is where a nonresident is carrying on a 
certain line of business such as selling securities or 
driving an automobile in the state and the statute 
requires service upon an officer in the state such as 
the Secretary of State for the nonresident. These cases 
all provide that a copy of the complaint and summons 
must be immediately sent, registered mail, with receipt 
requested, to the defendant. In that class of cases is 
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the case of International Shoe Company v. 'Washington, 
discussed in the plaintiff's brief at pages 32 and 33. 
The other method of serving nonresident defendants 
is that set forth in the third ·paragraph of the citation' 
from Davidson v. Doherty, where a nonresident volun-
tarily comes into the state and establishes an office 
or agency and. the service of summons is made by 
substituted service upon a manager, superintendent or 
agent of the defendant, and the action is one growing 
out of that office or agency. In this class of cases there 
is no requirement that 'a copy of the complaint and 
summons be mailed to the defendant, therefore it is· 
necessary that the one served be an agent, superintend-
ent or manager, whose· duty it is to transmit the 
summons when served upon him, and as said in the 
case of Melvin Pine & Company v. McConnell, supra, 
the agent must be one vested with general powers in-
volving judgment and discretion in connection with 
the defendant's business. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE 
DEFENDANT BY AND THROUGH R. W. DILL, THE PUR-
PORTED AGENT UPON WHOM SERVICE OF SUMMONS 
WAS MADE, WAS NOT DOING BUSINESS AT THE 
SCHOOL WHERE THE ATTEMPTED SERVICE OF SUM-
MONS WAS MADE WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF 
RULES 17 (e) and 4 (e) (10) OF THE RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
The cases cited above and the cases cited under 
Point Four cover this point. 
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POINT THREE 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE 
SCHOOL AT WHICH THE DEFENDANT'S PURPORTED 
AGENT WAS SERVED WITH SUMMONS WAS NOT A 
PLACE OF BUSINESS OF THE DEFENDANT WITHIN 
THE CONTEMPLATION OF RULE 17 (e) and 4 (e) (10). 
The cases cited above and the cases cited under 
Point Four cover this point. 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE 
CAUSE OF ACTION DID NOT ARISE OUT OF THE CON-
DUCT OF BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF UTAH WITHIN 
THE CONTEMPLATION OF RULE 17 (e) AND RULE 
4 (e) (10). 
Counsel for the plaintiff argues at length that 
Rule 17 (e) refers only to "action" and not "cause of 
action" and that under the statute a cause of action 
need not aris-e in Utah so long as the action is filed in 
Utah. At page 24 of plaintiff's brief, he states: 
"In those places where Justice Latimer indi-
cated that the situs of the cause of action had 
anything to do with the case, his statements 
were pure dicta and not significant since there 
was no reason in the W ein case for making such 
a distinction betwen the terms.'' 
The law is clear that nonresidents cannot be sued 
in this state except upon a cause of action which arises 
in this state. Justice Latimer's many statements in 
the W ein case concerning ''cause of action'' arising 
in this state were not dicta. They were merely a correct 
statement of the law. Without the limitations restrict-
ing the statute to causes of action arising in this state 
the act would be unconstitutional. 
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The plaintiff in his brief states that the Trial 
Court labored under the impression ~hat the cause of 
action must arise in Utah and that in that the Court 
was in error. The defendant submits that the Court 
was not in error on that point. 
After reviewing the authorities, Justice Latimer 
in the case of Wein v. Crockett, supra, stated the law 
to be as follows : 
''Having roughly traced the trend of authori-
ties a way from the strict and narrow holdings 
of the early cases to more liberal principles of 
permitting a nonresident to be sued in a juris-
diction where he has performed certain acts or 
transacted certain business, providing, the cause 
of action arose out of the acts or the business 
. transacted, we pass to consider whether or not 
our act meets the test of constitutionality as set 
forth by the later holdings of the Supreme 
Court. * * * 
''The act requires a service of process to be 
made on an agent of the nonresident and that 
the agent at the time of the service must be 
conducting the business for and on behalf of the 
nonresident and the action must arise out of 
the business trans'acted in the state. * * * 
"We can see no real objections to a statute 
which only forbids a nonresident from doing 
business in this state until such time as they 
have consented to the jurisdiction of our Courts 
to rule on causes of action springing into exist-
ence within this state and arising out of the 
business carried on in this state. We are not 
convinced that such 'an act, does, in fact, deny 
a nonresident equal protection of -the law or 
deprive them of property without due process 
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of law. If the cause of action ar1ses 1n this 
state, out of business being t~ansacted in this 
state, the possibilities are that the witnesses 
\vill be readily available here * * * To require 
a nonresident to defend where he commits an 
alleg·ed \vrong is not an unreasonable imposi-
tion.'' 
The follo\ving citations from 'W ein v. Crockett point 
out the reason for limiting the jurisdiction of the 
Court to causes of action arising in this state. The 
court said at page 230: 
''We are convinced under the pTesent day 
extensions of business into the various states and 
the rapidity of commuting interstate that the 
narrow principles of the early cases must be 
reexamined in the light of modern conditions, 
and that this state to properly protect its citizens 
must have a right to subject nonresidents who 
maintain offices and transact business herein, 
to be subject to the jurisdiction of our courts 
if an agent upon whom process can be served is 
still in the employment of the nonresident and 
if the cause of action arises out of the business 
transacted here. 
''This holding is not contrary to the holding 
of the Supreme Court in Flexner v. Farson, 
supra, and is consistent with the holding in the 
Howard L. Doherty & Company v. Goodman 
case, supTa. The Pennoyer case is clearly dis-
tinguishable from the one herein involved. In 
that case the agent upon whom process was 
served was not an agent at the time of service 
and the statute did not limit the suit to causes 
of action arising within the state. * * * 
"While it may appear unreasonable to re-
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quire a nonresident to defend actions which in 
no way arise out of the transaction of business 
in a foreign jurisdiction, as was attempted in 
other cited cases, it is not unreasonable to re-
quire a nonresident to defend his rights when 
the basis of the suit is the performance of cer-
tain acts within the jurisdiction where suit is 
instituted. By voluntarily doing business in this 
state a nonresident impliedly consents to being 
sued upon causes of action arising out of the 
transaction of business in this state and further 
impliedly consents that service may be made 
upon an agent in charge of the business office 
maintained here." 
The Court further said at page 226 as follows: 
"The Superior Court of Delaware in the case 
of Caldwell v. Amour et. al., 1 Pennewill 545, 
43 A. 517, held a similar statute unconstitutional 
for the reason that it deprives the defendant of 
property without due process of law. The· act 
under consideration by that Court was broader 
in scope than the act under consideration in 
this case for the reason that under the Delaware 
statute the cause of action need not arise out of 
the transaction of business in that state.'' 
At page 227 the Court further stated: 
''The Iowa statute required that the defend-
ant have an office or agency in a county; that 
the office be in a county other than that in which 
the defendant resides; that the action must grow 
out of the business of that office or agency and 
the agent upon whom service is made must be 
employed by the defendant in the office at the 
time of the service. '' 
At page 229 the Court stated: 
''But there would seem to be no objection to 
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a statute which forbids nonresidents to do busi-
ness within the state 'vithout having consente~d 
to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state as 
to all causes of action arising \vithin the state 
and out of the business carried on within the 
state * * * The words of Mr. Justice Swayne 
speaking of the unfairness of refusing a group the 
right to sue a foreign corporation in the state 
where the corporation was carrying on business 
and where the cause of action 1arises are equally 
applicable * * * The statute requiring persons 
carrying on business within the state to consent 
to service of process upon an agent in actions 
arising within the state out of the business car-
ried on within the state would therefore seem to 
fall within the proper scope of the police power.'' 
The following is a statement on the subject fron1 
Restatement of the Law-Conflicts, Section 84, page 130: 
"Unless limited by the Constitution, a state 
by its laws may absolutely forbid the doings of 
designated acts within the state. It may allow 
such acts to be done only after the person doing 
them has expressly agreed to subject himself to 
the jurisdiction of the state as to causes of ~action 
arising against him arising out of such acts. 
A state by its law may provide that the doing of 
such acts shall subject the person doing them to 
the jurisdiction of the courts of the state as to 
causes of action arising out of such acts. If 
such a rule or law is in force in the state at 
the time when such acts are done within the 
state, the person doing such acts thereby subjects 
himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
state as to causes of action arising out of such 
acts. The application of this principle to judg-
ments rendered by the courts of the states of 
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the United States is much limited because of 
the limitations on the part of the states to forbid 
the doing of acts within the states imposed by 
various provisions of the Constitution of the 
United States, especially the 14th Amendment 
and the clause relating to Interstate Commerce 
as shown in Section 85. '' 
In the case at bar the cause of action arose in Cali-
fornra and not in Utah. The original contract, Exhibit 
''B'', was signed in Los Angeles after the same had 
been signed by the plaintiff in S.alt Lake City, and 
thus became a California contract. The purported 
breach of the contract took place in California !and thus 
the cause of action arose in California. This point 
apparently the plaintiff concedes in his brief by the 
following statement found at pages 20 and 21: 
''It is not necessary that the cause of action 
(which might technically arise upon mailing a 
letter of termination in Los Angeles or Wash-
ington, D. C., and therefore have its technical 
situs there) arise in this state but only that the 
action arise out of conduct of the defendant's 
business in this state. * * * Thus, the defend-
ant would contend that although the action may 
arise out of conduct of business done in Utah, 
the technical situs of the cause of action is in 
California and arose upon placing the letter of 
cancell'ation in the mails. However, this argu-
ment is beside the point in view of the express 
wording of our statute." 
The defendant does contend that the cause of 
action arose in California. However, the argument IS 
not beside the point, but is most material. 
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The law on the question as to where a cause of 
action arises in such a matter as is now before the 
Court, is stated in Restatement of the Law-Contracts, 
Section 321, as follows : 
'• When Repudiation By Mail or Telegram Be-
conles a Breach. 
Statements of repudiation in a letter mailed 
or telegram sent to a promisee or other person 
having a right under a contract, which if made 
orally, would be a breach of contract, constitute 
a breach as of the time when and the place where 
the letter or telegram is dispatched.'' 
The case of Anglaize Box Board ~Company v. Kansas 
City Fibre Box Company, 35 Fed. (2d) 822, is directly 
in point. In that case the plaintiff, a corporation with 
its principal place of business at D'Ryton, Ohio, con-
tracted to sell to the defendant, a corporation with its 
principal place of business at Kansas City, Kansas, 
3"600 tons of jute under twelve separate contracts for 
a shipment once each month during the year. After 
receiving ten monthly shipments, the defendant and the 
plaintiff engaged in a dispute over the price of the 
November shipment and after considerable correspond-
ence, the defendant, on December 11, 1920, wrote a 
letter to the plain tiff and placed it in the mails at 
Kansas City, Kansas, repudiating the contract for 
shipments to be made for November and December. 
The plaintiff treated the repudiation as a breach and 
sued for damages. The question arose as to the time 
and place of breach and accrual of the cause of action 
because the Statute of Limitations in Kansas ''Tas 
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five years and the Statute of Limitations in Ohio on 
such an action was fifteen years. In deciding the case, 
the Court s~aid : 
''It has been repeatedly held that where such 
repudiation is relied upon as a breach, the 
cause of action arises where the repudiation 
occurred, and it is also the rule that, where the 
repudiation is by letter, the breach occurs at the 
time and place of the delivery of the letter for 
transmission, clearly, therefore, the breach oc-
curred at Kansas City when the letter of De-
cember 11 was mailed and as this action was not 
instituted until more than five years thereafter, 
it was barred under the Kansas Statute of 
Limitations. '' 
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CONCLUSION 
The defendant therefore submits that the Trial 
Court "~as right in ruling that the Court did not ac-
quire jurisdiction of the defendant. R. W. Dill was 
not an agent in charge of defendant's business within 
the contemplation of the statute. The school 'a.t which 
the attempted service was made w.as not a place of 
business of the defendant within the contemplation of 
the statute. The cause of action did not arise in Utah 
and the Trial Court was right in holding that the 
cause of action did not arise out of the conduct of 
business done in this state within the contemplation 
of the statute. 
For the reasons hereinbefore pointed out, it is 
submitted that the ruling of the Trial Court should 
be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. GRANT IVERS~ON, 
Attorney for Pt6d11liff AfifJSlhtnl. 
Defendant-Respondent. 
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